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Friends of the Earth v.
Crown Central Petroleum':
The Surrogate Enforcer Must Be
Allowed to "Stand Up" for
the Clean Water Act
JOHN DOLGETTA*
I. Introduction
This Case Note examines the doctrine of standing in
light of the Fifth Circuit's decision in Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp.2 The decision in
Crown Central deals with the doctrine of standing and
whether the environmental organization, Friends of the
Earth (FOE), met the requirements of standing necessary to
bring a lawsuit under the Clean Water Act (CWA or Act).
Here, FOE brought suit against Crown Central Petroleum al-
leging discharge and reporting violations under the CWA. 3
The Fifth Circuit held that plaintiffs, who use a waterway (a
lake) approximately eighteen miles downstream from the de-
fendant's point of discharge, did not adduce sufficient evi-
dence to survive a motion for summary judgment because
they did not meet the "fairly traceable" requirement of stand-
1. 95 F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 1996).
* B.A. 1995, Fordham University; J.D. 1998, Pace University School of
Law. The author would like to thank all the members of his family, particularly
his parents, Carmela and Pellegrino, for their love and support, and most espe-
cially his fiancde, Anna, for her unrelenting patience, love and support through-
out his law school career. The author would also like to thank editors Andrew
Provence and Sapna Walter and associates of the Pace Environmental Law Re-
view for their assistance in editing this Case Note.
2. 95 F.3d 358.
3. Id. at 360. See generally Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972
(CWA) §§ 101-521, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1381 (1995).
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ing established by the Supreme Court.4 Generally, this Case
Note will analyze the doctrine of standing as it applies to en-
vironmental cases brought under the CWA. More specifically,
this Note will discuss whether the Fifth Circuit correctly in-
terpreted the existing law regarding standing under the CWA
and whether it rightfully denied standing to FOE.
Congress enacted the CWA, also known as the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, with the goal of
"restor[ing] and maintain[ing] the natural chemical, physical,
and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."5 Congress re-
alized the magnitude of such a program and the logistical
problems in implementing it. As a result, it recognized the
importance citizens could have in promoting the specific goals
enunciated in the CWA, and gave them the statutory stand-
ing needed to bring suits against those who violate specific
provisions of the Act.6 Furthermore, Congress also decided
that "[a] high degree of informed public participation in the
control process is essential to the accomplishment of the
objectives [of the Act,] ... a restored and protected natural
environment." 7
Part II of this Case Note discusses the general back-
ground of the CWA, particularly the legislative history which
outlines its goals and the role that citizens have in acting as
its surrogate enforcers. Part II also discusses the doctrine of
standing as it applies to plaintiffs in environmental cases.
Although the plaintiffs benefit from a statutory grant of
standing, they must first establish that they have met the Ar-
ticle III standing requirements under the United States Con-
stitution, which require a showing of "distinct and palpable
injury."8 In addition, Part II presents the relevant statutory
4. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation
of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (enunciating the requirements
for individual standing). Standing will be discussed in Part II of this Case Note.
5. S. REP. No. 92-414, 2, 10 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668,
3676 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 92-414] (from a section entitled "Discussion of
Intent").
6. CWA § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365.
7. See S. REP. No. 92-414, supra note 5, at 11.
8. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)(stating that once "this
[Article III] requirement is satisfied, persons to whom Congress has granted a
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss2/11
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sections of the Act that apply to Crown Central, specifically,
section 505. 9
Furthermore, Part II discusses the existing case law on
standing used by the Fifth Circuit in arriving at its rather
narrow and novel decision in Crown Central. It examines
other cases, not relied upon by the Fifth Circuit, which ad-
dress the requirements of establishing standing, and specifi-
cally, the "fairly traceable" requirement. This part will also
present views opposing citizen suits and the fairly liberal
standing requirements that courts have been applying in
these cases.
Part III discusses the facts and the procedural history of
Crown Central. Part III presents the holding of the Fifth Cir-
cuit and the method of reasoning that the court used in arriv-
ing at its fairly novel decision that the plaintiffs failed to
establish standing.
Part IV of this Case Note analyzes the court of appeals
decision in Crown Central, and establishes that it had no ba-
sis upon which to grant summary judgment in favor of the
defendant. Furthermore, it also establishes that there was a
genuine issue of fact to be determined at trial, namely,
whether the discharge of Crown Central did in fact reach the
waters, particularly Lake Palestine, that FOE stated were, or
could eventually be, affected by the pollution discharged by
the defendant. This Note argues that the Fifth Circuit did
not have sufficient evidence to establish that defendant's dis-
charge did not affect the waterways in which FOE claimed an
interest.
Part V of this Case Note concludes that environmental
organizations and citizens deserve an expanded doctrine of
standing because of the great benefit that results for society.
The surrogate enforcer should be allowed to stand up for the
environment and in opposition to those who blatantly violate
the laws without regard for the effects on the environment.
right of action, either expressly or by clear implication, may have standing to
seek relief on the basis of legal rights and interests of others, and, indeed, may
invoke the general public interest in support of their claim").
9. CWA § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365.
3
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II. Background
A. The Clean Water Act: The Intent Behind
the Legislation
The Clean Water Act was introduced in 1972 in response
to the ineffectiveness of prior legislation.' 0 As the Senate Re-
port indicated, "[t]he legislation recommended by the Com-
mittee proposes a major change in the enforcement
mechanism of the Federal water pollution control program
from water quality standards to effluent limit [ationsi."1 The
change in policy was made because of "the great difficulty as-
sociated with establishing reliable and enforceable precise ef-
fluent limitations on the basis of a given stream quality."1 2
The problem was that "[w]ater quality standards, in addition
to their deficiencies in relying on the assimilative capacity of
receiving waters, often cannot be translated into effluent lim-
itations-defendable in court tests, because of the impreci-
sion of models for water quality and the effects of effluents in
most waters."13 Therefore, the ultimate goal of the CWA is to
focus attention and resources on effluent limitation stan-
dards, that is, controlling the amount of pollution that an en-
tity can discharge rather than attempting to control and
10. See generally S. REP. No. 92-414, supra note 5, at 10-12.
11. Id. at 7. See also Sharon Elliot, Citizen Suits Under The Clean Water
Act: Waiting For Godot in the Fifth Circuit, 62 TUL. L. REV. 175 (1987) [herein-
after Elliot].
Sharon Elliot provides an excellent explanation of what "effluent limita-
tions" mean in the context of the CWA:
'Effluent limitations' represent specific restrictions on discharges
and limit the quantities, rates, and concentrations of substances
that may be discharged from point sources. These limitations are
usually expressed numerically, for example by the concentration of
a discharged pollutant, and are meant to be applied to all point
sources. A 'point source' means the point at which the pollutant-
containing effluent is released. The industrial community refers to
point sources at industrial plants as 'outfalls.' The Act authorizes
the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to es-
tablish effluent limitations for different categories of point sources.
Id. at 177-78;
12. See S. REP. No. 92-414, supra note 5, at 7.
13. Id. at 7-8.
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss2/11
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measure pollution when it has already entered the
waterways. 14
To effectively administer this new change in policy, the
founders of the CWA also established a permit system. This
system requires those who need to discharge pollutants into
waterways to acquire permits that limit the amount of efflu-
ent.15 These permits, also known as National Pollution Dis-
charge Elimination System (NPDES) permits, require
permitees to regularly sample their discharges and to per-
form standardized tests to determine the levels of pollutants
being discharged into receiving waters and whether such dis-
charge exceeds permit limits. 16 The Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) and agencies of states with federally
approved discharge programs, are the only entities that may
issue a permit.17 Violators of permits may be subject to both
civil and criminal liability.' 8 Once these permit holders sam-
ple their discharges, they must then submit the results in the
form of discharge monitoring reports (DMRs) to the proper
authority.1 9 These DMRs are made available to the public,20
and can be used as evidence to establish discharge violations
and reporting violations. 21
14. Id.
15. CWA § 482, 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
16. See Elliot, supra note 11, at 178. See also Theodore L. Garret, Citizen
Suits After Gwaltney, C266 ALI-ABA 305 (1988) [hereinafter Garret].
17. See Garret, supra note 16, at 308.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. DMRs are discharge monitoring reports, that effluent dischargers
have to maintain by law, which record the amount of effluent a particular com-
pany discharges, which is then given to the EPA and which are then ultimately
made available to the public. Id.
21. Id.
The discharge of any pollutant not complying with a NPDES permit
violates the Act unless the Act itself otherwise authorizes it.
NPDES permits also contain monitoring and reporting require-
ments, designed to make the permits enforceable. Permit holders
must install monitoring equipment to regulate and sample their ef-
fluent, and keep records of the results, so that they can be reported
as prescribed by the [EPA] Administrator. Such reports are called
discharge monitoring reports (DMRs) and must be filed by the
holder of each federal or state issued NPDES permit. The labora-
5
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B. The Citizen and the Power to Bring Suit
Congress recognized the need for additional assistance in
implementing and enforcing the goals of the Act.22 Congress
looked to the citizens, the ones most directly affected by the
discharge of pollutants into the waterways, for assistance in
implementing the CWA.23 The Senate. report clearly indi-
cated that an "essential element in any control program in-
volving the nation's waters is public participation." 24 As a
result, Congress also made certain to include a "citizen suit"
provision, 25 which allows anyone affected by a discharger's
pollution to bring a civil suit against any person or entity that
is alleged to be in violation of its NPDES permit.26 The CWA
also allows any person to bring a suit against the Administra-
tor of the EPA for failure to perform an act that is required
and "non-discretionary."27 The legislative intent is to empha-
size the importance of the citizen suit provision and to stress
that "enforcement of these control provisions [must] be imme-
diate, that citizens should be unconstrained to bring these ac-
tions, and that the courts should not hesitate to consider
them."28 Section 505(a)(1) of the CWA empowers citizens to
bring suits against polluters and provides in relevant part:
tory results are used to prepare the DMRs. The DMRs are filed
between one to three months after a sample is taken.
Elliot, supra note 11, at 180-81. See also Requirements for Recording and Re-
porting of Monitoring Results, 40 C.F.R. § 122.48 (1998).
22. See S. REP. No. 92-414, supra note 5, at 7-11.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 69.
25. CWA § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365.
26. See S. REP. No. 92-414, supra note 5, at 75. See also CWA § 505, 33
U.S.C. § 1365.
27. See CWA § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365. See also S. REP. No. 92-414, supra
note 5, at 75. It is clear that Congress intended that citizens have an essential
role in enforcing the CWA, as is evident by the fact that they are even allowed to
bring suit against the EPA Administrator, or any state administrator, who is
not fulfilling his/her obligation under the CWA.
28. S. REP. No. 92-414, supra note 5, at 76. See also Charles N. Nauen,
Citizen Environmental Lawsuits After Gwaltney: The Thrill of Victory and the
Agony of Defeat? 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 327, 329 (1989)(stressing the impor-
tance of the "unique enforcement mechanism," known as the citizen suit, that
Congress has implemented in its attempt to eradicate water pollution under the
CWA); Elliot, supra note 11, at 199 (highlighting the key role citizens have
under the CWA and referring to such citizens as "private attorneys general").
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss2/11
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[a]ny citizen may commence a civil action on his own be-
half-
(1) against any person (including the (i) United States
and (ii) any other governmental instrumentality or agency
to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the
Constitution)... alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent
standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order
issued by the Administrator or a State with respect such a
standard or limitation, or
(2) against the Administrator where there is an al-
leged failure of the Administrator to perform any act or
duty which is not discretionary with the Administrator.29
The statute defines a "citizen" as "a person or persons having
an interest which is or may be adversely affected."30 It gives
citizens a very unique and tremendous power to enforce viola-
tions of the CWA. The citizen suit provision, which was the
result of a compromise between the House and the Senate,3 1
has been the source of much debate and discussion. 32
29. CWA § 505(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1).
30. Id. at § 505(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g).
31. See Arthur G. Carine, III, The Clean Water Act, Standing, And The
Third Circuit's Failure to Clean Up The Quagmire: Public Interest Research
Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 4 VILL. ENVTL. L. J.
179 (1993)(explaining the debate that took place between the House and Senate
on this specific provision).
This article explains, in relevant part, that:
The citizen suit provision of section 505, intended to mirror the con-
stitutional standing requirements set forth in Sierra Club v. Mor-
ton, was the result of compromise between the House of
Representatives and the Senate. The House bill attempted to re-
strict standing to affected citizens within a local area or groups ac-
tively participating in the administrative process. In sharp
contrast to the House proposal, the Senate bill permitted 'any per-
son' to sue. In compromise form, section 505 of the Clean Water Act
empowers to sue 'violators'. . . [and], a 'person,' [as] defined for pur-
poses of the Clean Water Act, includes corporations and associa-
tions; consequently, environmental group plaintiffs qualify as
citizens under the Clean Water Act.
Id. at 182.
32. See generally Stephen J. Driscoll, Environmental Private Actions: Are
Special Interest Groups Hobbling Comprehensive Programs Without "Standing"
Themselves?, 24 RuTGERs L.J. 469 (1993)(concluding that environmental groups
and special interest groups hamper comprehensive governmental programs
through extensive litigation); Mark S. Fisch, The Judiciary Begins To Erect An-
7
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C. The Citizen Must Have Standing
Standing is a critical element in any environmental law-
suit. The key to success in most environmental law cases
usually depends upon the plaintiff proving standing.33 The
courts play a critical role in determining whether or not a
particular plaintiff has standing.34 Roger Beers, in a course
of study presented by the American Law Institute, stresses
the important role that the doctrine of standing has played in
environmental cases. 35 Beers points out that "there has been
little consistency and considerable confusion in past judicial
opinions regarding the elements of standing . . . . 36 How-
ever, there have been several Supreme Court cases that have
set forth a number of requirements and 'tests used in estab-
lishing standing on both an individual and an organizational
basis. 37 EPA officials have stressed that "[riegardless of the
other Dam Against Citizen Suits Under The Clean Water Act, 22 STETSON L.
REV. 209 (1992) (noting that the courts increasingly seem to be limiting the
number of citizen suits brought by conducting a careful analysis of the standing
requirements).
33. See Karl S. Coplan, Private Enforcement Of Federal Pollution Control
Laws-The Citizen Suit Provisions, SA85/3 ALI-ABA 1033, 1041 (1996) [herein-
after Coplan] (identifying that there are only four cases where standing was
denied and nearly 44 cases where standing was affirmed). Karl S. Coplan is an
Associate Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Environmental Litigation
Clinic at Pace University School of Law.
34. Id.
35. Roger Beers, Standing and Related Procedural Hurdles In Environmen-
tal Litigation, C127 ALI-ABA 1 (1995).
Beers states:
In American Jurisprudence, the concept of 'standing to sue' is one
aspect of the 'case or controversy' limitation on federal jurisdiction
contained in Article III of the Constitution. While it thus cuts
across every subject matter of litigation, it has rarely had the deci-
sive role in shaping a body of law as it has had in the environmen-
tal field .... Indeed, standing to protect environmental interests is
now so firmly entrenched that it is surprising to recall that less
than twenty-five years ago few courts had opened their doors to the
protection of anything but economic or property rights.
Id.
36. Id. at 4.
37. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 508 (1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740-41, n.16 (1972); Whit-
more v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 159-61 (1990); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976).
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss2/11
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theoretical considerations at issue, it is clear that Congress
fashioned a distinct role for private enforcement under the
Clean Water Act and that national environmental groups,
among others, have seized the opportunity presented to
them."38
Although it is clear that Congress has given citizens stat-
utory standing to bring suit, it also requires them to establish
that they have Article III standing.39 This "enthusiasm [to
bring suit] has led environmental organizations and citizens/
plaintiffs to mistakenly believe they have standing to sue any
time a discharge permit is violated."40 However, there have
been few cases where standing has been denied in environ-
mental cases. Actually, the opposite is true; in most cases,
standing has been quite readily recognized. 41
D. The Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Standing
Doctrine
Even where a plaintiff establishes standing as required
by the statute, the plaintiff must also establish standing
under Article III of the Constitution. 42 In many environmen-
tal cases, the plaintiff is an organization and therefore must
meet the requirements set out in two separate tests estab-
lished by the Supreme Court. The first test is set out in Lu-
jan v. Defenders of Wildlife.43
38. Courtney M. Price, Private Enforcement Of The Clean Water Act, 1 WTR
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 31 (1986) [hereinafter Price] (Courtney Price was, at
the time the article was written, Assistant Administrator for the Enforcement
and Compliance Monitoring sector of the EPA in Washington, D.C.).
39. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1-3. See also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
at 756 (articulating the elements of standing under Article III of the
Constitution).
40. Patrick McDermott, Environmental Groups, Aesthetic Injury, and Citi-
zen Suits: Standing Takes A Stand Under PIRG v. Powell Duffryn Terminals,
12 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 521, 532 (1992).
41. See Coplan, supra note 33, at 1041.
42. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1-3. See also Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United For Separation of Church & State Inc., 454 U.S. at
464.
43. 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)(holding that environmental groups, which
challenged a regulation of the Secretary of the Interior dealing with the Endan-
gered Species Act and funds for projects that would harm animals, lacked
standing). See also Coplan, supra note 33, at 1041-42 (stating that there seems
9
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In Lujan, the Supreme Court reiterated a three-part test
which established the "irreducible constitutional minimum"
required for standing. 44 The Supreme Court stated the ele-
ments as follows:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an 'injury in fact'-
an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) con-
crete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not
'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.' Second, there must be a
causal connection between the injury and the conduct com-
plained of-the injury has to be 'fairly ... trace[able] to the
challenged action of the defendant and not ... th[e] result
[of] the independent action of some third party not before
the court.' Third, it must be 'likely,' as opposed to merely
'speculative,' that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision. 45
The Supreme Court also explained that "particularized"
means that "the injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal
and individual way."4 6
The plaintiff, in "invoking federal jurisdiction[,] bears the
burden of establishing these elements."47 The plaintiff must
present enough proof as is required by the various stages of a
lawsuit, such as the pleading stage, summary judgment
phase, or trial stage.48 Once these elements have been
to be a "retrenchment in the earlier expansion of standing for citizens" as is
evident by recent Supreme Court decisions in Lujan 11, 504 U.S. 555, and Lujan
v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990)).
44. Lujan 1I, 504 U.S. at 560.
45. Id. (citations omitted)
46. Id. at 561.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 561-62.
The Supreme Court explains the different evidence required by the succes-
sive stages of a lawsuit as follows:
At the pleading stage, general factual allegation of injury resulting
from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss
'we presum[e] that general allegations embrace those specific facts
that are necessary to support the claim.' In response to a summary
judgment motion, however, the plaintiff can no longer rest on such
'mere allegations,' but must 'set forth' by affidavit or other evidence
'specific facts,' Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e), which for the purposes of
the summary judgment motion will be taken to be true. And at the
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss2/11
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proven and the plaintiff meets his burden, standing will be
established, but merely for the individual. However, as
stated earlier, many plaintiffs are environmental organiza-
tions that seek to protect our Nation's waters.49
The Supreme Court has also established requirements
which an organization must fulfill before it can bring suit
against an alleged violator. The environmental organization
must establish "associational standing," as first enumerated
in the Supreme Court's decision in Warth v. Seldin,50 and ul-
timately set forth as a three-part test in Hunt v. Washington
State Apple Advertising Commission.51 The Court in Hunt
set forth a three-part test, based on the Warth decision,
which stated that:
final [trial] stage, those facts (if controverted) must be 'supported
adequately by the evidence adduced at trial.'
,=ft
Id. (citations omitted).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that the sum-
mary judgment sought "shall be rendered forthwith if the plead-
ings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits if any, show that there is no genu-
ine issue as to an material fact and that the moving party is enti-
tled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See also
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Vygen Corp., 803 F.
Supp. 97 (N.D. Ohio 1992) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317 (1986)); FED. R. Cry. P. 56(e).
49. See Price, supra note 38 and accompanying text.
50. 422 U.S. 490, 490 (1975).
The Supreme Court in Warth explained the theory behind the associational
standing doctrine and stated that,
Even in the absence of injury to itself, an association may have
standing solely as the representative of its members .... The asso-
ciation must allege that its members, or any one of them, are suffer-
ing immediate or threatened injury as a result of the challenged
action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the
members themselves brought suit .... So long as this can be estab-
lished, and so long as the nature of the claim and of the relief
sought does not make the individual participation of each injured
party indispensable to the proper resolution of the cause, the asso-
ciation may be an appropriate representative of its members, enti-
tled to invoke the court's jurisdiction.
Id. at 511 (citations omitted).
51. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
11
718 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15
an association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its
members when: (a) its members would otherwise have
standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks
to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and
(c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested re-
quires the participation of individual members in the
lawsuit.
5 2
Therefore, an environmental organization bringing suit as a
representative of one of its members, must make certain that
the member on whose behalf it is suing has standing as an
individual. In addition, the organization must establish the
separate requirements needed for associational standing as
elicited above.53
F. Cases Relied Upon by the Fifth Circuit In Its Analysis
1. Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc.
v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc.5 4
In Powell Duffryn, various environmental organizations
brought suit against an effluent discharger under the CWA
for violating its NPDES permit.5 5 The defendant operated a
bulk storage facility where it stored liquids from different
companies which ultimately caused pollutants to be dis-
charged into the Kill Van Kull in violation of its NPDES per-
mits. 56 The plaintiff submitted affidavits of several members
52. Id. at 343.
53. Id. The language of the first prong of the test developed in Hunt re-
quires that an organization can only bring a suit on behalf of its members only
if the members themselves are able to "sue individually" and therefore, must
establish individual standing before organizational standing is established. See
Hunt v. Washington State Apples Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. at 343. See also
National Treasury Employees Union v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 25
F.3d 237, 241 (5th Cir. 1994); Save Our Community, Inc. v. United States
Envtl. Protection Agency, 971 F.2d 1155, 1160 (5th Cir. 1992).
54. 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991).
55. Powell Duffryn, 913 F.2d at 65.
56.
[Defendant], a New Jersey corporation, is an NPDES permit holder
operating a large storage facility in Bayonne, New Jersey. This
tank farm is located on land adjacent to the Kill Van Kull, a naviga-
ble body of water. [Defendant] uses the large tanks at the site to
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss2/11
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each "stat[ing] that they are members of ... the plaintiff or-
ganizations and reside in the vicinity of the Kill Van Kull."57
These affidavits further indicated that certain members
"hike, jog or bicycle along the shores of the Kill Van Kull"5 8
while others "recreate in the Kill Van Kull Park, a public
park located approximately two miles downstream of [defend-
ant's dischargel."59 Moreover, some of the members "indi-
cated that they would boat, fish or swim there if the water
were cleaner."60 Nevertheless, the defendant, Powell Duffryn
Inc., contended that the plaintiff did not meet the require-
ments of standing.61
In finding that the plaintiff did meet the requirements of
standing, the Third Circuit set forth a detailed explanation of
the elements of individual standing: injury-in-fact, 62 causa-
tion,63 and redressability.64 The court pointed out that the
injuries set forth in the affidavits were sufficient to satisfy the
injury-in-fact prong. It stated, quoting the Supreme Court,65
that "harm to aesthetic and recreational interests is sufficient
to confer standing."66 The court also further indicated that
"[tihese injuries need not be large, 'an identifiable trifle' 67 will
suffice." 68
store various liquids owned by others. These liquids include petro-
leum products and industrial chemicals. When liquids are trans-
ferred [to the others], some spillage occurs. The spillage mixes with
rainwater and the run-off pollutes the Kill Van Kull.
Id. at 68.
57. Id. at 71.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 68.
61. Id.
62. See Lujan 1I, 504 U.S. at 560.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. at 727.
66. Powell Duffryn, 913 F.2d at 71.
67. Id. (quoting United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (1973)).
68. See Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57 (2d Cir.
1985) (establishing injury where a member of an environmental organization
passes by a body of water and is offended by the way it looks); see also Public
Interest Research Group of N.J. v. New Jersey Expressway Auth., 822 F.Supp.
174 (D.N.J. 1992)(determining that the smell of the affected waterways and the
13
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The Third Circuit also addressed the second element of
standing-the "fairly traceable" prong. The defendant ar-
gued that its effluent had such a negligible effect on the af-
fected waterway, as supported by expert testimony,69 that it
could not have possibly caused the injury alleged by the
plaintiff. The Third Circuit held that "the requirement that
the plaintiffs injuries be 'fairly traceable' to the defendant's
conduct does not mean that the plaintiff must show to a sci-
entific certainty that defendant's effluent alone caused the
precise harm suffered by the plaintiffs." 70 Furthermore, the
court stated that "[a] plaintiff need not prove causation with
absolute scientific rigor to defeat a motion for summary judg-
ment."71 The court held that, in order to prove that a plain-
tiffs harm is "fairly traceable" to the defendant's discharges,
a plaintiff must "only show that there is a 'substantial likeli-
hood' that the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiffs
harm."72 The Third Circuit then set forth three requirements
necessary to establish "substantial likelihood," by stating:
members refusal to fish in these waters were enough to establish injury-in-fact);
Save Our Community v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 971 F.2d 1155
(5th Cir. 1992) (establishing injury-in-fact where the aesthetic and recreational
interests of members of an environmental organization living near wetlands
polluted by defendant, were affected).
69. Powell Duffryn, 913 F.2d at 71-72 (finding that an engineering consult-
ant's testimony that "to a reasonable scientific certainty ... [Powell Duffryn's]
operation [did] not adversely affect water quality in the Kill Van Kull," except
in a most "speculative and theoretical way," was insufficient to establish that
plaintiffs did not suffer any injury).
70. Id. at 72.
71. Id.
72. Id. (quoting Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc. 438
U.S. 59, 75 (1978)). See also Robert Wiygul, Gwaltney Eight Years Later: Prov-
ing Jurisdiction and Article III Standing In Clean Water Act Citizen Suits, 8
TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 435, 451 (1995)(stressing that the three-part test established
in Powell Duffryn has been widely adopted by many courts for determining
whether the plaintiffs injury is fairly traceable to the defendant's discharge).
Many circuit courts, including the Fifth Circuit, have adopted the three-
part test established by the Powell Duffryn court. See Sierra Club v. Cedar
Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 57 (1996); Save
Our Community v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 971 F.2d at 1155;
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Texaco Ref. & Mktg., Inc., 2 F.3d
493 (3d Cir. 1993); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Watkins, 954
F.2d 974 (4th Cir. 1992).
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In a Clean Water Act case, this likelihood may be estab-
lished by showing that a defendant has (1) discharged
some pollutant in concentrations greater than allowed by
its permit (2) into a waterway in which the plaintiffs have
an interest that is or may be adversely affected by the pol-
lutant and that (3) this pollutant causes or contributes to
the kinds of injuries alleged by the plaintiffs.73
However, it is essential to point out that the Third Circuit
realized that a plaintiff alleging merely an exceedance of a
permit requirement is not enough to establish this causation
element. 74 The court explained that the plaintiff must show,
through the use of publically available DMRs, 75 that the type
of pollutants that defendant discharges cause the types of
harms alleged by the plaintiff. 76
The third element of redressability "is closely related to
the 'fairly traceable' element."77 The Third Circuit explained
that "[w]hile the fairly traceable element focuses on the con-
nection between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiffs
injury, the redressability factor focuses on the connection be-
tween plaintiffs injury and the judicial relief sought."78 This
element addresses the issue of whether the relief, if granted
by the court to the plaintiff, will redress the problem, which
in this case is pollution of a waterway. The court stated that
if relief were granted, such as the award of civil penalties or
the grant of an injunction, it would deter the defendant from
violating its permit, thereby reducing the amount of pollution
in the Kill Van Kull. 79 Although the Third Circuit effectively
73. Powell Duffryn, 913 F.2d at 72. The court further explains in footnote 8,
that:
In many of these [CWAI cases, there are several parties discharging
into the affected waterway. In order to obtain standing, plaintiffs
need not sue every discharger in one action, since the pollution of
any one may be shown to cause some part of the injury suffered.
The size of the injury is not germane to the standing analysis.
Id., n.8 (citation omitted).
74. Id. at 72-73.
75. See supra note 19 and accompanying text; see also 40 C.F.R. § 122.48.
76. Id.
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explained what is required to show injury-in-fact, causation,
and redressability, this Case Note will focus on the "fairly
traceable" or causation requirement as set forth by the Third
Circuit in interpreting various Supreme Court decisions.
2. Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co. 80
The Fifth Circuit in Cedar Point adopted the three-part
test that the Third Circuit established in Powell Duffryn.
Cedar Point also involved an environmental organization
bringing suit against an oil company which discharged pro-
duced water into Galveston Bay in Texas and violated
NPDES permit requirements under the Clean Water Act.81
Several members of the Sierra Club stated in their affidavits,
that they used portions of the Bay "for various recreational
activities, including swimming, canoeing, and bird watch-
ing."8 2 They stated that they were familiar with produced
water and its effects, and were "concerned that the continued
discharge of produced water [would] impair [their] ability to
enjoy the activities in which [they] participate."8 3 In this
case, only one of the three affiants was actually engaged in
activities near the discharge site. The other two affiants did
not actually go near the site.8 4 Defendant argued that the
"concern" expressed by the members was not sufficient to
support injury-in-fact.8 5
The Fifth Circuit in Cedar Point further added to the
standing analysis in its decision. The court held that
whether the "affiants were 'concerned' or 'believed' or 'knew
to a moral certainty' that produced water would adversely af-
80. 73 F.3d at 546-79.
81. Id. at 546. The court in Cedar Point defined "produced water" as
follows:
Produced water originates as source water trapped in underground
geological formations with oil and gas. When a well is drilled into a
formation, the extraction of oil and gas also brings the water to the
surface. During extraction, chemicals used in the drilling process
become mixed with the water. The result is produced water.
Id. at 550.
82. Id. at 556.
83. Id.
84. See id.
85. Id. at 556.
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fect their activities on the bay is [a] semantic distinction that
makes little difference in the standing analysis."8 6 The court
further stated:
The requirement that a party demonstrate an injury-in-
fact is designed to limit access to the courts to those 'who
have a direct stake in the outcome,' as opposed to those
who would convert the judicial process into 'no more than a
vehicle for the vindication of the value interest of con-
cerned bystanders.'87
Moreover it pointed out that "[a]ll of the affiants expressed
fear that . . . produced water will impair their enjoyment of
these [recreational] activities because these activities are de-
pendant upon good water quality."88 It also stressed "[tihat
this injury is couched in terms of future impairment... [and]
is of no moment. The Supreme Court has expressly held that
'a threatened injury' will satisfy the 'injury in fact' require-
ment for standing."8 9
The Fifth Circuit also addressed the "fairly traceable"
prong of the standing test, and adopted the three-part test set
forth in Powell Duffryn.90 The court held that in order to
meet the "fairly traceable" requirement, there is no need for
"scientific certainty"91 and that it is "sufficient for Sierra Club
to show that Cedar Point's discharge of produced water con-
tributes to the pollution that impairs [a member's] use of the
bay."92 Therefore, it is enough that the plaintiff shows that
86. Id.
87. Id. (quoting United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973) (citations omitted)).
88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. Id. (quoting Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472).
90. Id. at 557 (citing Powell Duffryn, 913 F.2d at 72). See infra Part II.F.1
(presenting the elements of the "fairly traceable" test).
91. Cedar Point, 73 F.3d at 558. See also Save Our Community, 971 F.2d at
1161 (quoting Powell Duffryn, 913 F.2d at 72); Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil
Co., 73 F.3d 546 (reemphasizing that the plaintiffs are not required to establish
the fairly traceable element through scientific certainty).
92. Cedar Point,73 F.3d at 558. See also Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc. v. Watkins, 954 F.2d 974, 980.
17
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the pollution discharged is of the type that causes the specific
harm alleged.
3. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Chevron
Chemical Co. 93
This case directly addressed the "fairly traceable" re-
quirement and whether causation can be proven when the af-
fected waterway is far down stream from the point of the
discharge. In this case, the defendant was issued a NPDES
permit which allowed it to discharge into Round Bunch Gully,
which flowed into the Cow Bayou, then into Sabine River and
ultimately into Sabine Lake.94 Sabine Lake is where the
plaintiffs resided and where they claim the harm had been
realized.95
The defendant in this case argued that there was no
measurable effect of their discharge on the waterway in ques-
tion. It offered the following expert testimony:
Chevron's discharge could have no measurable or observa-
ble effect on the water quality of Sabine Lake .... Chev-
ron's maximum effluent discharge is 0.17% of the flow into
Sabine Lake .... The exceedingly small contribution of
Chevron's effluent to the inflow of Sabine Lake makes it
clear that this discharge has no measurable or observable
impacts on the water quality in Sabine Lake.9 6
The district court, in holding that this evidence did not
refute plaintiffs standing, stated:
It is true that Defendant does not discharge directly into
Lake Sabine; rather, Defendant's discharge flows into
Round Bunch Gully, into Cow Bayou, into the Sabine
River, which empties out into Sabine Lake and the Gulf of
Mexico .... While there are intermediary bodies of water
between Defendant's plant and Sabine Lake, Defendant's
discharge will eventually spill into Sabine Lake... [which]
93. 900 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Tex. 1995).
94. Id. at 70.
95. See id. at 75.
96. Id.
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is somewhere between two and four miles [away]. The dis-
tance between these two points is not so great and the in-
teraction is not so tenuous that this court cannot find that
Plaintiffs interest in Sabine Lake will be unaffected by De-
fendant's [discharge]. 97
Therefore, in viewing the different bodies of water as con-
nected and ultimately as part of one continuous waterway,
the district court seemed to set forth a test in helping to es-
tablish the fairly traceable element. The court indicated that
although the distance (between the discharge point and an
affected waterway) does matter, one must also look at the in-
teraction between the various bodies of water which are
linked to one another and which flow into each other.98
III. Friends of the Earth v. Crown Central Petroleum
Corp.99
A. Facts and Procedural History
Members of the environmental organization, Friends of
the Earth, who "birdwatch[ed] and fish[ed] at a lake some 18
miles and three tributaries from the source of the unlawful
water pollution," brought suit against Crown Central Petro-
leum for discharge violations under the CWA.100 FOE alleged
that its members "reside in the vicinity of, or own property or
recreate in, on or near the waters of Black Fork Creek, Prai-
rie Creek, Lake Palestine, the Neches River, and the Neches
River basin and tidally related waters affected by [defend-
ant's] allegedly unlawful conduct." 01 The complaint was
substantiated by three different affidavits from members who
had joined the organization immediately before or right after
FOE filed its complaint with the court.'0 2 FOE alleged that
97. Id.
98. See id.
99. Crown Central, 95 F.3d at 358.
100. Id. at 359.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 359-60. None of these three members were with the organiza-
tion when the 60-day notice letter was sent to the defendant. See id. at 360.
19
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since the "waterway"10 3 into which the defendant discharged
was part of the same waterway, and ultimately flowed down-
stream into Lake Palestine, the causal connection should be
satisfied. 104
The district court held that the plaintiff lacked standing
because, the single affiant, who was a valid member at the
time the lawsuit was initiated, did not suffer an injury-in-
fact.10 5 The district court further held that even if the plain-
tiff did suffer injury, the injury itself was not fairly traceable
to the defendant's conduct. 10 6 Plaintiff appealed its dismissal
to the Fifth Circuit. 10 7
B. Holding and Reasoning
The Fifth Circuit concluded that FOE did not satisfy the
"fairly traceable" element, and affirmed the district court's
decision granting summary judgment in favor of Crown Cen-
tral Petroleum.108 The Fifth Circuit did not entirely rely on
the decision handed down by the district court. 0 9 Rather,
the Fifth Circuit in Crown Central only addressed the "fairly
traceable" requirement of standing. 0
The Fifth Circuit held that FOE did not meet the "fairly
traceable" element of standing. The court did not address the
issues regarding the "injury-in-fact" requirement or the
"redressability" requirement established in prior cases."'
103. FOE alleged that Crown Central discharges pollution into Black Fork
Creek, which flows into Prairie Creek, which flows into the Neches River, and
which ultimately flows into the Lake Palestine. See id. at 359.
104. See id. at 361.
105. Id. at 360.
106. See id.
107. Id. at 358.
108. Id.
109. See Friends of the Earth v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., No. 94-
CV489, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16338 (E.D. Tex. 1995).
110. Crown Central, 95 F.3d at 358. "The district court found for [Crown
Central Petroleum] on the first two elements[,]" which include[d] the fact that
the plaintiffs have" ... suffered an actual or threatened injury[,] [and that] the
injury will likely be redressed if it prevails in the lawsuit." Id. However, the
Fifth Circuit stated that it would not address these elements because it "con-
clude [d] that plaintiffs fail on the requirement that the injury be 'fairly tracea-
ble' to [Crown Central's] discharges." Id. at 360.
111. Id. at 360-61.
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The court stressed the fact that the point of discharge was
eighteen miles away, but did not conclude that was indeed
"too far" and not part of the same waterway. 112 Rather, it
assumed that even if it were part of the same "waterway," it
was "too large to infer causation.""13 The Fifth Circuit stated
that "[iin short, FOE and its members relied solely on the tru-
ism that water flows downstream and inferred therefrom that
any injury suffered downstream is 'fairly traceable' to the un-
lawful discharges upstream."" 4
The court of appeals simply held that "common sense"
would require more proof, such as water samples or expert
testimony (rather than simply the affidavits of these mem-
bers stating that they are affected by discharges eighteen
miles away). 1 5 The Fifth Circuit further stated that "[a]t
some point this common sense observation becomes little
more than surmise. At that point certainly the requirements
of Article III are not met."" 6
The court did not make an attempt to establish or define
a "point" at which standing can no longer be established. The
court's decision is very vague. The Fifth Circuit, emphasizing
the "narrow" scope of its holding, stressed that it was not "im-
pos [ing] a mileage or tributary limit for plaintiffs proceeding
under the citizen suit provision of the CWA."11 7 Rather, the
court stated that plaintiffs located "far downstream from the
source of unlawful pollution may satisfy the 'fairly traceable'
element by relying on alternative types of evidence."' "' The
court further explained that FOE could have "produce[d]
water samples showing that the presence of a pollutant of the
type discharged by the defendant upstream""19 or introduced
expert testimony establishing that the pollution upstream
contributed to a "perceivable effect" on the water the plaintiff
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 361.
115. Id. at 361-62.
116. Id.
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used downstream. 120 In summary, although the plaintiff may
have been affected by the defendant's discharge, the court de-
termined that the plaintiff should have produced additional
types of evidence to establish that the harm was fairly tracea-
ble to the defendant.
IV. Analysis
The Fifth Circuit in Crown Central seems to have created
a new requirement for establishing the "fairly traceable"
prong of the standing analysis. The Fifth Circuit denied
standing to FOE because it did not present scientific evidence
that the defendant's discharge ultimately reached the waters
alleged to be affected by the discharges. The Fifth Circuit
held that the distance was too far to infer causation, and re-
quired either expert testimony or scientific proof that the de-
fendant's discharge affected Lake Palestine. Additionally,
the court in Crown Central did not find that Lake Palestine
was not part of the affected waterway; rather, it assumed
that it was part of the same waterway. 121 On this basis, the
court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Existing case law consistently stresses that the plaintiffs
do not have to establish to a scientific certainty that the de-
fendant's discharge is adversely affecting the waterway in
question. 22 Relying on the language of the Crown Central
court's decision, "plaintiffs may produce water samples ... or
rely on expert testimony,"' 23 it is clear that this language is
permissive and does not require that such types of evidence
be produced at such a preliminary stage of the lawsuit in or-
der to establish standing. Case law also clearly indicates that
a plaintiff does not have to show that any harm has yet to
occur.124 Rather, a plaintiff can simply state that harm may
occur and that future impairment is sufficient to establish in-
120. Id.
121. Id. at 361.
122. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. See also supra Part II.F.1
(stating that scientific certainty not required to prove causation in summary
judgment stage).
123. Crown Central, 95 F.3d at 362 (emphasis added).
124. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 490.
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jury. 125 Therefore, FOE should have been given the opportu-
nity at trial to produce the additional evidence required to
prove that the defendant's discharge did reach the Lake Pal-
estine and could eventually cause future harm.
It is critical to point out that the parties were at a prelim-
inary stage in the lawsuit-the summary judgment stage. 126
Additional evidence could have been introduced at trial to es-
tablish the scientific proof necessary to determine whether or
not defendant's discharges did reach Lake Palestine. During
the summary judgment phase, there must be no genuine is-
sue of fact present in order for the judge to grant summary
judgment against the non-moving party.1 27 During the sum-
mary judgment phase, the non-moving party is required to
set forth specific facts "by affidavit or other evidence," which
will be taken as true for the purposes of summary judge-
ment.128 If any genuine factual issues are raised, then sum-
mary judgment should be denied and the case must proceed
to trial.
Here, FOE submitted affidavits of three members stating
that they were adversely affected by the defendant's dis-
charge. The affidavits presented by FOE must then be sup-
ported at trial with additional evidence if they are
controverted by the defendant. 29 The defendant could have
then presented evidence establishing that the pollution in the
affected waterway does not consist of the same pollution the
125. See id.
126. In reviewing summary judgment motions,
[a] [clourt must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party to determine whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists. A fact is 'material' only if its resolution will affect the
outcome of the lawsuit. Determination of whether a factual issue is
'genuine' requires consideration of the applicable evidentiary stan-
dards. Thus, in most civil cases the court must decide 'whether rea-
sonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence that
the [non-moving party] is entitled to a verdict.'
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Vygen Corp., 803 F. Supp. at 100.
127. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. See also Lujan 11, 504 U.S. at
562 (indicating that summary judgment will be granted when there is no genu-
ine issue of fact to decide upon); FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
128. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
129. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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plaintiff alleged it discharged. Therefore, there existed a gen-
uine issue of fact to be adduced at trial: whether the pollu-
tant of the type that the defendant discharges is present in
Lake Palestine.
Furthermore, there was never any mention of the exist-
ence of another entity or company that was located between
the point of discharge and Lake Palestine that could have
been responsible for discharging similar pollutants, thereby
severing the causal relationship. These are all factual issues
that should have been presented at trial so that the trier-of-
fact could have decided whether the defendant's discharge
adversely affected Lake Palestine. Parties must be allowed to
present expert testimony and additional scientific evidence at
trial, at which point a judge or jury can determine whether or
not there is enough proof to establish that the defendant's
discharge pollutes the waterway.
The Fifth Circuit simply determined, without ultimately
deciding that the distance was too far, that the eighteen mile
distance could not allow a trier-of-fact to infer causation with-
out more evidence. However, in arriving at its decision, the
Fifth Circuit did not seem to apply any of the elements of the
test created by the Powell Duffryn court establishing the
"fairly traceable" element of the standing test.130 The Powell
Duffryn test requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant
discharged excessive pollutants into a waterway in which the
"plaintiffs have an interest or [which] may be adversely af-
fected by the pollutant and that the pollutant causes or con-
tributes to the [types] of injuries" that FOE and its members
alleged. 131 The court of appeals in Powell Duffryn further ex-
plained that no matter how negligible the effect of the defend-
ant's discharge is on a particular body of water, it can still be
regarded as an injury. 132 Under this test, an "identifiable tri-
130. See supra, Part II.F.1 (presenting the "fairly traceable" test presented
in Powell Duffryn).
131. Crown Central, 95 F.3d at 358, 360-61 (quoting Powell Duffryn, 913
F.2d at 77).
132. See Powell Duffryn, 913 F.2d at 71.
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fle" is enough to claim injury.133 Here, FOE clearly alleged
more than an "identifiable trifle;" it alleged 344 NPDES Per-
mit violations.13 4 Therefore, the first prong of the fairly trace-
able test was, in fact, satisfied.
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit, in assuming that Lake
Palestine was part of the same waterway as Black Fork
Creek,' 35 conceded that Crown Central Petroleum discharged
run-off into a waterway in which the plaintiff had an interest.
Therefore, the second prong of the "fairly traceable" test also
seemed to clearly be satisfied.
Finally, the court did not even address the third prong of
the test. The third prong deals with the issue of whether the
pollutants discharged by Crown Central Petroleum caused or
contributed to the kinds of injuries suffered by the plaintiff.
Here, the pollutants discharged by the defendant clearly con-
tributed to the legally recognized aesthetic injuries alleged by
FOE and its members, 36 ultimately satisfying the third
prong of the test.
The plaintiff should have been granted standing to sue
Crown Central because it established that the harm that they
have suffered or could eventually suffer was "fairly traceable"
to the defendant's discharge. Here, the Fifth Circuit required
that the plaintiff prove its injury before they ever got to trial.
It is the trier-of-fact that should decide whether the defend-
ant has injured the plaintiff. A judge or jury, as the trier-of-
fact, should have been allowed to decide whether the plaintiff
was injured (or will be injured) by the defendant's pollution
only after all of the evidence has been presented, after all of
the expert witnesses have taken the stand and after all of the
scientific tests have been analyzed. It seems that the Fifth
Circuit has proclaimed that lawsuits should never go to trial;
rather, they should all be disposed of at the summary judg-
ment phase. The Fifth Circuit has effectively restricted the
133. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (explaining what constitutes
an "identifiable trifle").
134. Id.
135. Crown Central, 95 F.3d at 361.
136. See supra Part III.A.
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ability of an environmental organization to bring suit against
a defendant who is clearly polluting the waterways.
V. Conclusion
It is important that citizens and environmental organiza-
tions be given the necessary power and leeway to enforce the
Clean Water Act. Congress has specifically given citizens an
important and critical role in enforcing environmental laws
through citizen suit provisions. Under these provisions, a cit-
izen must have standing before he can bring suit against a
discharger and must meet the aforementioned standing re-
quirements. It is clear that the government has limited re-
sources, and has recognized the need for the assistance of
citizens and environmental organizations in protecting the
environment.
However, the Fifth Circuit in Crown Central denied FOE
and its members the right to protect the environment by
bringing suit against polluters who were clearly discharging
great quantities of pollutants into our Nation's waters in vio-
lation of the CWA. The defendant violated its permit limits
344 times and discharged great quantities of pollution into
the waterway. The courts should have allowed the case to
proceed to the'trial stage in order to determine the issue of
whether the pollution reached and, in turn, affected Lake
Palestine. If, at trial, the plaintiff could not establish that the
types of pollutants that the defendant discharged were pres-
ent in the body of water in question, then, and only then,
should the judge take it upon him/herself to state that there
is no causation and that this particular plaintiff has not been,
nor will be, affected by this particular defendant.
The plaintiff had no reason, other than to protect the en-
vironment, for bringing this lawsuit. The money that the de-
fendant pays goes to the government-it does not go to the
plaintiff.137 Citizens and environmental organizations do not
137. One could argue that these environmental organizations are just creat-
ing work for themselves and, ultimately, their attorneys are the ones who bene-
fit (monetarily) from these lawsuits. However, the lawyers in most cases will
not bring frivolous lawsuits in light of the sanctions the courts could impose on
them for doing so. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c).
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get any direct payment of money from this type of lawsuit.
Rather, the only benefit they get is that the defendant is
hopefully deterred from polluting the waterway in the future.
The surrogate enforcer must be allowed to stand up for the
environment and the courts must be open to their role as pri-
vate attorneys general.
27
